For the past 20 years, I have been studying the foundations of the conceptual system in infancy. For some researchers, the notion of infant concepts is an oxymoron. The field of cognitive development was dominated by Piaget for so long that many people inherited an entrenched notion that there is a long period of purely sensorimotor development in infancy. It was thought necessary for babies to develop perceptual and motor routines (i.e., to learn to recognize and interact with familiar objects and people around them) before they could begin to form concepts. Piaget himself thought that a conceptual system only begins to be formed sometime between 18 and 24 months (Piaget, 1952) , although today even convinced Piagetians agree that this process begins somewhat sooner.
However, in the past decade, a substantial body of research findings at considerably earlier ages has accumulated that is difficult if not impossible to explain on the basis of learned perceptual and motor routines and that seems to require conceptual processing. One body of research involves recall of the past. Piaget defined recall as the evocation of absent objects (or events) and used its appearance, which he found to be around the middle of the second year, as one of the hallmarks of an emerging conceptual system. Another body of research involves categorizing objects on the basis of conceptual meaning, rather than on the basis of their perceptual appearance. Inhelder and Piaget (1964) and Vygotsky (1962) found that it was not until age five years or older that children would consistently sort objects into taxonomic categories, for example, putting assorted vehicles in one group and assorted pieces of furniture in another, although later research showed that at least some taxonomic sorting can occur even in two-to three-year-olds (Sugarman, 1983) . A third kind of research concerns making inductive inferences. Piaget himself did not address this topic in infants, but it is of interest because generalizing on the basis of nonperceptual knowledge must be based either on spatiotemporal associations or on conceptual meaning, and the latter has traditionally been thought to be a late development. However, Gelman and Coley (1990) found that two-year-olds can make inferences on the basis of class membership rather than relying solely on perceptual similarity. Thus, even though these functions were generally considered to have a late onset, there are some hints in the literature that they may develop earlier.
I first discuss the evidence indicating that all three of these functions-recall of the past, conceptual categorization, and conceptually based inference-develop in the first year of life. Then I discuss the implications of an early onset of these processes for the kind of representational system that infants must have at their disposal. I begin with recall because this area of infant study has accumulated the most research, including the contrasting neurological bases of recall and procedural (sensorimotor) memory.
Recall of the Past
Recall is what allows people to bring absent objects or past events to conscious awareness; that is, it requires a declarative system that can represent information not present to the senses. Studies of the neural substrate subserving recall have shown major differences between this kind of declarative memory and sensorimotor (procedural) memory, such as conditioning, skill learning, and priming (see Bauer, Deboer, & Lukowski, 2007 , for a review). Procedural memory begins very early in infancy; sensorimotor information is learned and retained but does not require conceptualization or even conscious encoding. There are many differences between the two kinds of memory: For example, procedural memory is unselective, more context bound, relatively slow to learn, and inaccessible to conscious reflection, whereas declarative memory is selective, is less subject to context effects, can be learned in one trial, and is accessible to awareness (see Mandler, 2004 Mandler, , 2007 . In turn, these differences are associated with different neural systems that develop at different rates (Bauer et al., 2007) .
Psychologists have typically studied verbal recall; however, Bauer and Shore (1987) , Bauer and Mandler (1989a) , and Meltzoff (1988) all showed that recall could be studied nonverbally by the technique of deferred imitation. Meltzoff was the first to work with infants under one year of age. He showed nine-month-olds a novel event, such as depressing a recessed button on a box that made the top open, and then waited for 24 hours before giving the box to the infants. He found that significantly more infants depressed the button in the experimental group than in a control group that received the box without the modeled action.
Meltzoff (1988) only tested single actions (as opposed to event sequences such as used by Bauer and Mandler, 1989a) . Not everyone (see Mandler's, 1990, discussion) was willing to accept that reproducing a single action, even after a day's delay, could not be accomplished on the basis of rapid sensorimotor learning. It is important, therefore, that Carver and Bauer (1999) found that about half of the 9-month-olds they tested could reproduce a novel sequence of two actions after a day's delay, and the majority of 10-month-olds could recall such sequences after a month's delay (Carver & Bauer, 2001 ). Barr, Dowden, and Hayne (1996) found that even a few 6-month-olds can reproduce an action sequence after a day's delay, although most infants this age succeed in reproducing only a single action. Correct ordering of events matters because there is no perceptual support mediating memory for the order in which past actions happened. To remove any lingering doubts that to reproduce an event sequence after a delay requires processes similar to those required for recalling an event verbally, McDonough, Mandler, McKee, and Squire (1995) showed that adults with amnesia were unable to reproduce simple event sequences after a day's delay. Even under conditions designed to allow priming, the participants were unable to remember what to do.
Thus, the data indicate that recall processes begin to come on line at around 6 months of age and by 9 to 10 months are well established. The processes required-conceptual encoding, consolidation, and retrieval-develop considerably over the first two years (Bauer et al., 2007) . Nevertheless, from around 10 to 11 months, some recall is possible over periods of a year or longer (McDonough & Mandler, 1994) and can sometimes even be verbalized at a later date (Myers, Clifton, & Clarkson, 1987) .
Conceptual Categorization
Another way to investigate preverbal concepts is through categorization studies. Traditionally, children's conceptual categorization was studied by sorting tasks under instructions to put together things that are the same or alike. Preverbal infants neither sort objects into piles nor understand detailed instructions; however, in one of our early studies, we found that 16-month-olds make taxonomic choices in a match-to-sample task, if the task is preceded by clapping and cheering for such choices to convey the task demands (Bauer & Mandler, 1989b) . We also began to use another technique, pioneered by Ricciuti (1965) , who studied perceptual categorization. He showed that if several identical objects from two categories (e.g., four red squares and four blue squares) are put in front of infants, the order in which infants touch the objects reflects categorization in ways similar to sorting (a method since labeled the sequentialtouching technique). Nelson (1973) showed that conceptual categories could also be studied this way.
Another way of studying categorization is by the habituation-dishabituation method, in which infants are shown a series of pictures of items from one category and are then presented with an item from another category; they are said to distinguish the categories if they look longer at the lat-ter. This technique was also traditionally used with perceptual categories, but it can be applied to conceptual categories as well (e.g., pictures of dogs vs. cats). Of course, such conceptual categories can also be distinguished on perceptual grounds (Mareschal, French, & Quinn, 2000) .
In my lab, we adapted both the sequential-touching and the habituation-dishabituation methods to study conceptual categorization. We developed statistical tests for significance of runs of touches in the sequential-touching technique and found evidence at 14 months of what we called contextual categories (things that are considered the same in some way but do not look alike). Our specific categories were kitchen things versus bathroom things-that is, things associated on a spatiotemporal basis (Mandler, Fivush, & Reznick, 1987) . We also found evidence from the sequential-touching task of superordinate categories, such as animals and vehicles, in 18-month-olds, accompanied by lack of categorizing of basic-level classes within these superordinates (Mandler, Bauer, & McDonough, 1991) . Because we continued to find a lack of differentiation within superordinate categories, we began to call them global instead of superordinate.
We wanted to test younger children, but the sequentialtouching technique does not work well under one year of age. We decided to try the habituation-dishabituation task but found that looking at slides of objects tends to bore children in the last part of the first year. So we expanded an object-examination task, first used by Oakes, Madole, and Cohen (1991) , in which infants manipulate little models instead of looking at slides. With this technique, which is very engaging for infants, we found that even 7-montholds showed categorization of animals versus vehicles versus furniture. Little subcategorization was found within the animal domain: Infants from 7 to 11 months did not differentiate dogs from rabbits or fish, although at 9 months they differentiated dogs from birds (7-month-olds were not tested), and by 11 months they differentiated dogs and cats, animals with which they were likely to have had the most experience (Mandler & McDonough, 1993 , 1998a . No subcategorization was found in this age range for furniture: Tables, chairs, and beds were not differentiated, nor until 11 months was a distinction made between furniture and kitchen utensils. These findings weren't what conventional wisdom predicted, namely, that basic-level concepts are the first to be formed and that superordinate concepts like animals and vehicles are late acquisitions. Yet, the only basiclevel categorization we found was for vehicles: Even 7-month-olds distinguished cars and airplanes (a distinction we would classify as global-air vs. land vehicles). Cars, however, were also distinguished from motorcycles by 9-and 11-month-olds (7-month-olds were not tested). So-called basic-level concepts (never well defined, but consisting of object concepts used in everyday language, like dog, chair, and car) were thought to be the first type of concepts formed, because exemplars in a given class look a lot like each other and quite different from other classes-in short, because of high within-class perceptual similarity and low between-class similarity (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) . Such classes were assumed to be grounded in Piaget's sensorimotor schemes and, thus, to be the easiest for children to begin to conceptualize. We were finding something rather different in our infant studies, however, and combined with the finding of contextual categories (which by definition are not perceptually based), we started thinking afresh about concept formation in infancy.
In our first attempt to rule out perceptual similarity as the sole basis for the categorization performance we were observing, McDonough and I contrasted little models of birds with outstretched wings with airplanes. These models look a great deal alike but were rarely confused by the 9-month-olds we tested (Mandler & McDonough, 1993) . Perceptual similarity and/or something special about basiclevel concepts seemed less and less likely as ways to account for early concept formation. Still, perceptual similarity is hard to rule out as the basis for categorizing objects, because one vehicle does look more like another vehicle than, for example, an animal. However, Pauen (2002) systematically varied between-category similarity of models of animals and furniture and found that 10-and 11-montholds categorized appropriately, regardless of whether between-category perceptual similarity was high or low. Taking still another tack, McDonough and I devised a test we called generalized imitation, which provided additional powerful evidence for the conceptual basis of infants' performance on categorization tests.
Inductive Generalization
Everyone, but perhaps especially babies, must generalize whether a new object can be categorized as the same as a known thing on the basis of limited experiences. It can be done on the basis of similarity in the way things look, but perceptual appearances can be misleading, so more frequently adults generalize on the basis of conceptual kind. In contrast, the traditional view of infants' generalizations (e.g., Quine, 1977) was that because they have no concepts, they can generalize only on the basis of perceptual similarity (which Keil, 1991 , dubbed the doctrine of original sim). Our categorization data showing the ability to generalize across very dissimilar objects led us to suspect this view.
We first tested generalization with 14-month-olds by using little models of objects to model simple events (giving a dog a drink from a cup or a dog being put in a bed, and starting a car with a key or a car giving a child a ride; Mandler & McDonough, 1996) . However, instead of giving the dog back to the infants to imitate drinking (or sleep-ing), we gave a different animal (e.g., cat or bird), along with a vehicle and the cup (or bed). Instead of giving the car back to the infant to imitate starting a car with a key (or giving a ride), we gave the infants a different vehicle (e.g., bus or airplane) along with an animal and the key (or child). In this way, by varying both the physical similarity and the conceptual relatedness of the test objects to the modeled objects and by observing which object, if any, the infants chose to use, we could determine the factors that controlled generalization.
We found that infants treated all animals alike, freely substituting them in a drinking or sleeping event, and treated all vehicles alike, freely substituting them in a keying or riding event. At the same time, they rarely used an object from the wrong domain. A second experiment used atypical animals and vehicles as distractors (e.g., armadillo and forklift), and the same results were obtained. Furthermore, if we modeled incorrect events (e.g., putting a car to bed) along with correct events, infants generally refused to imitate the incorrect events. We found the same results with 9-and 11-month-olds, although we had to simplify the procedure and 9-month-olds, who are just beginning to be able to imitate events using objects, had low response rates (McDonough & Mandler, 1998) . In still another study (Mandler & McDonough, 1998b) , we found that infants were quite willing to cross domain boundaries in their imitations if the modeled behavior was appropriate, such as washing both an animal and a car.
These data strongly suggested that the infants were generalizing on the basis of conceptual similarity rather than perceptual similarity and furthermore that they were generalizing behavior observed with only a few animal and vehicle kinds across entire domains. They were not confining their generalizations to particular kinds of animals or vehicles. We decided to test this view in the most straightforward possible way. In another series of experiments with 14-month-olds (Mandler & McDonough, 1998b) , we modeled events with a dog and tested generalization with a similar-looking dog, using a cat, a rabbit, a bird, or a novel mammal as the distractor. We also modeled events with a car and tested generalization with a similar-looking car, using a truck, a motorcycle, an airplane, or a novel land vehicle as the distractor.
Even 3-month-olds categorize pictures of dogs as different from cats, presumably on perceptual grounds alone (Quinn, Eimas, & Rosenkrantz, 1993) , so if perceptual similarity is the key to generalization in these experiments, infants should choose the new dog for their imitations rather than less similar-appearing mammals. The same reasoning applies to vehicles. However, what we found was that 14-month-olds chose randomly among the mammals for their imitations, showing a lower choice only of the bird. They simply did not heed the differences among the various mammals tested. This finding indicated that the infants were responding on the basis of a category something like land animal but not on the basis of dog. (More research is needed to specify the defining characteristics of land animal for infants.) Different results were obtained for the vehicle tests; the infants differentiated cars from trucks, motorcycles, and airplanes (but not a forklift or shoveler). This result mirrored the previous finding of more detailed categorization of vehicles than animals from 7 to 11 months (although not those of our first inductive generalization study). It suggests that, at least in southern California, the concept car becomes differentiated from other road vehicles sooner than land animals become differentiated.
Familiarity probably matters in these generalization tests; 14-month-olds might choose to use a novel animal or vehicle for novelty's sake. However, they do not cross superordinate boundaries, clearly treating animals as different from vehicles. They also tend to treat land animals as different from birds and show more advanced subcategorization in the case of vehicles. Overall, the data suggest a progression from a global level of categorization by a process of differentiation to more detailed subdivisions. Our next experiments (Mandler & McDonough, 1998b , 2000 began to test just when so-called basic-level concepts (other than car) appear on the scene.
In a series of experiments (Mandler & McDonough, 1998b , 2000 , we used the same generalized imitation technique to test 14-, 19-, and 24-month-olds' knowledge about basic-level characteristics, such as that dogs but not birds eat bones, that people smell flowers rather than trees, that they drink from cups rather than from frying pans, and that they wash dishes in a sink rather than a bathtub. We modeled little events as before and gave the children a choice between another item from the same category and another item from a (related) category. We found that 14-montholds were indiscriminate in their choice of objects from the same or a related basic-level category to use to imitate events involving animals, plants, household artifacts, and vehicles. For example, after seeing a little model of a child being given a drink from a cup and being offered the choice of a mug and a frying pan, they tended to choose randomly. By 19 months, they were making correct choices for household artifacts and vehicles but were still fairly indiscriminate in their choices for animals and plants. By 2 years, they were accurate for both natural kinds and artifacts.
It is not that infants know nothing about these concepts. When we made the contrasts between the test objects greater, such as sitting at a table on a chair versus a flattopped car or washing dishes in a sink versus a bed, 14-month-olds were generally correct. At this age, however, their concepts appear to be overly general and only gradually become differentiated over the course of the second year. The differentiation in our urban sample of children was clearly more rapid for artifacts than for natural kinds, presumably because of their greater daily experience with artifacts than with animals and plants.
These data again make clear the difficulty in finding a perceptual explanation for the data, such as saying that correct behavior could merely be due to choosing the test object that perceptually matched the modeled object. If that were the case, then one would expect the children always to choose an object from the same basic-level category used in the modeling, because these almost invariably make the closest perceptual match, and there should not be a difference in treatment of animals compared with artifacts. Several investigators have suggested that our categorization and generalization data can all be explained on the basis of perceptual processes (e.g., Quinn & Eimas, 2000; see Mandler, 2000 , for a reply), but to my knowledge, no one has formulated a perceptual account that can encompass all the findings described here. Needless to say, both categorization and generalization can and do often take place on the basis of perceptual similarity. The claim here is only that even infants also generalize on the basis of conceptual similarity.
Where Do Concepts Come From?
The findings strongly suggest that early in development, infants often do not pay attention to the details of the appearance of many objects. They clearly have the perceptual capacity to do so, as shown by many experiments in which concentrated exposure to perceptual information is presented (e.g., Quinn et al., 1993) , but in their daily interaction with the world, more of their attention appears to be paid to what things are doing than to the details of the objects participating in the events. (The same is undoubtedly true of adults, but they have had vastly more opportunities to also attend to object detail.) Bahrick, Gogate, and Ruiz (2002) showed that 5 1/2-month-olds processed and maintained more information about the actions of people than what they and the objects they manipulated looked like. The data described earlier on the slow progression from global concepts down to more detailed ones also suggest that paying attention to fine perceptual details is something that infants only gradually do, perhaps more so when language begins to be learned and directs attention to the detail needed to learn the common nouns representing basiclevel concepts (Mandler, 2004) .
Forming a concept before language requires a simplification of perceptual information. Perception itself is too rich to be incorporated whole, but needs to be simplified in some way if it is to be used conceptually to interpret the world. Given the large literature indicating that even adults do not attend to and are not aware of most of the perceptual information they process (e.g., Mack & Rock, 1998) and given that if information is not attended to it does not enter explicit (declarative) memory (e.g., Graf, Mandler, & Haden, 1982) , it seems a reasonable assumption that attentional processing is required for conceptual interpretation to take place.
So, if not perceptual details of objects, what is it that infants do pay attention to that sets the stage for interpretation of what they perceive? Although more research is needed to answer this question definitively, researchers do know that motion especially attracts infants' attention (sometimes even compulsively so), and a few spatial relations are attentional attractors as well. Newborns have poor acuity, but from birth they attend to and track the motion of objects within their view (Haith, 1980) . As young as two months, infants respond differently to objects that move independently from their actions than to objects that act contingently with them, which they treat as animate, as shown by smiling (Frye, Rawling, Moore, & Myers, 1983; Watson, 1972) . By three months, infants differentiate biological from nonbiological motions of both people (Bertenthal, 1993 ) and other mammals (Arterberry & Bornstein, 2002) , and by five months, they can categorize animals and vehicles when the only information they have is how the objects move (Arterberry & Bornstein, 2001) . At least by four to six months, infants attend both to the beginning of an object's path of motion (Leslie, 1982) and to what happens at its ending (Woodward, 1998) . They attend to whether an object begins to move by itself (as opposed to something else coming in contact with it) or begins with contact from another object (Leslie, 1982) . Nine-montholds become upset if a machine-like object starts motion by itself (Poulin-Dubois, Lepage, & Ferland, 1996) .
From these simple kinds of processing, infants can derive a great deal of conceptual information about objects. Some move and some don't. Some move by themselves and others move only when something else contacts them. Some move together in coordinated ways and others don't. This kind of information does not require perceptual detail, but it provides a serviceable basis for the global characterization of animals and inanimate objects: Animals are selfmovers that sometimes interact with other objects from a distance, and inanimate objects are things that don't move at all, or if they do, they do so only when contacted by something else and do not interact with other objects from a distance. Because this information is both readily available and fundamental, I theorized that the first conceptual division is between animals and nonanimals, that it can appear very early (even before good foveal information is in place), and that later refinements consist of subdivisions of this first conceptual split (Mandler, 2004) .
This view also suggests that domain-specific knowledge about animals and inanimate objects does not need to be built in, as some psychologists have theorized (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1994) . The perceptual system itself provides the kind of information that can differentiate these domains. In addition, of course, there are salient perceptual features, such as eyes, that help identify something as an animal for infants. It is important to recognize, however, that identification of the category to which an object belongs is not the same thing as conceptualizing what sort of thing the object is. One can identify an animal by its eyes, but that does not mean that having eyes is the core of what an animal means for an infant (or for that matter, for an adult).
Spatial information of several sorts is useful in subdividing domains. For example, the early subdivision of birds and land animals may be due to infants noticing that birds are often up in the air. More detailed perceptual learning can also contribute to subdivision, for example, legs versus wings, although researchers do not yet know whether the subdivision of legs versus wings matters because of its contribution to overall different shape or to the difference in motion. In addition, concepts such as kitchen things and bathroom things may, in the first instance, depend on spatial location as well as on the events that take place in the two locations.
The earliest relational concepts are also closely allied to motion and are also spatial in nature. The concepts animal or inanimate thing are not spatial concepts, even though they are derived from spatial information, but concepts like containment, contact, or attachment not only are based on motion through space but remain spatial (ignoring for this discussion their metaphorical extensions). Although we have a lot of information on infants' responses to spatial relations in various experiments, it may be more difficult to determine whether their responses in a given experiment are conceptual or merely responses to perceptual expectations based on what they normally see. For example, infants in Baillargeon and colleagues' experiments (see Baillargeon & Wang, 2002) display increased sensitivity to the quantitative relations involved in containment and support over the course of the first year. But do they do so on the basis of increasing conceptual understanding or because of increasingly detailed perceptual expectations of the way that objects behave in space (or both)?
For some researchers, this is a nonquestion because they do not distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge. For those of us who do, this is an important issue, although not one that is completely resolved. It is clear, however, that over the course of the first year, infants attend to and learn increasing detail about going in, out, up, down, on, and off. Furthermore, infants can recall spatial relations after a relatively brief absence (Baillargeon, 1986; McDonough, 1999) , suggesting a conceptual rather than perceptual process. By nine months, they respond to spatial relations per se (rather than to objects that display a given relation), as evidenced by generalizing a relation such as going in across widely varying perceptual displays (McDonough, Choi, & Mandler, 2003) .
The Spatial Primitives That Enable Concept Formation
I have theorized that in the case of both objects and relations, the preverbal concepts that are formed are derived from salient spatial information, much of it motion based. A simple analyzing mechanism, such as the one I have proposed (perceptual meaning analysis; Mandler, 2004) that is sensitive to certain types of spatial input, is sufficient to simplify the information. I have suggested that the representations that result are in the form of image schemas of the sort discussed by cognitive linguists as composing the meanings underlying language (e.g., Lakoff, 1987) . Image schemas make an ideal representational format for the needed simplification in that they maintain the essential elements of spatial information while simplifying them into discrete, albeit analog, patterns that may be combined for purposes of forming conscious images and for conscious thought (Mandler, 1992 (Mandler, , 2005 . Although image schemas as a representational format for perceptually derived concepts have much to recommend them, other proposals somewhat related to this one have been suggested by Barsalou (1999) and Karmiloff-Smith (1992) . This is a place where Piaget's discussion of the onset of concept formation came up short. He saw the need but had no clear idea about the kind of mechanism required to move from his sensorimotor to his preoperational stage (Piaget, 1952) . However, it is important to remember his insight that infants are continually learning complex sensorimotor routines. The question I am addressing here is how they conceive of the objects and actions that make up these routines. At the outset, such concepts must be considerably simpler than the routines themselves, and of course there are countless abstract concepts that infants do not begin to conceive. Nevertheless, the conceptual system begun in infancy remains throughout normal life.
Any mechanism doing the simplification must have a vocabulary, or set of primitives, that it uses to describe the complex information it processes. One might think that such a vocabulary must be large, but surprisingly, it may be quite small-perhaps no more than 25 or so aspects of motion and spatial relations (Mandler, in press ). I described earlier how first concepts of animal and nonanimal may require only a few such notions. Similarly, the simplest concepts of events may be the kinds of path descriptions described earlier in terms of going in, out, on, off, up, and down. Even a simple concept of physical cause seems to stem from perceiving the transfer of motion from one object to another (Mandler, 2004; Michotte, 1963) . All of these can be derived from a few salient spatial relations. These seem to be innate attentional foci and can be considered developmental primitives, in the sense that it is from these beginnings that the conceptual system develops.
A brief list of the constituents that may be sufficient to represent infants' beginning interpretation of events are the following: First is the notion of path of an object, including start-of-path and end-of-path. Other motion primitives are into -container, out-of-container, onto-surface, off-ofsurface, up , and down. In addition to these, there are linked paths (expressing contingent interactions among objects), blocked path (an object that stops the ongoing motion of another object), and motion transfer. Obviously related to these are the primitive notions of container, contact, surface, and attachment. (The last of these may be the first interpretation of support.) There are undoubtedly more; for example, behind and between are likely candidates (see Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001; Quinn, Adams, Kennedy, Shettler, & Wasnik, 2003) , but not many more appear to be needed to construct from perception the global preverbal concepts discussed here.
I stress again that these are redescribed spatial inputs that enable simple interpretations of what is happening when objects move through space and interact with each other. They are derived from perception, but for purposes of thought, they have been simplified. For example, a perceived container has a particular size, shape, and so forth, but the spatial primitive container used to interpret it does not: It consists only of a thing with an inside and an outside and a boundary between. An object moving through space has a direction and speed, but the spatial primitive path used to interpret the scene does not. These primitives are simplified in a way similar to the way that topological representations simplify Euclidean space.
Going Beyond Spatial Primitives
Assuming that some process such as this accounts for the earliest concepts, we must then ask how concepts become more complex. I have already mentioned one way: Global concepts become subdivided. Some subdivision must arise from further attention to spatial information, as in noticing that up animals have a particular shape and moving appendages on the side or that surface animals have appendages that move on the underside. Although researchers know that infants learn such associations, they have virtually no information about exactly how and when this kind of conceptual associative growth proceeds. However, the work described in this article shows that at least by late in the first year, infants have made many global associations, such as that all animals drink and all vehicles give rides. The fact that some of these associations, such as fish drinking or airplanes being keyed, have not been experienced is, of course, an indication that they are conceptually, rather than spatiotemporally, based.
Although detailed shape learning may occur early, our data suggest that learning the associations that differentiate specific types of animals and artifacts occurs later in infancy; for example, as discussed earlier, most land mammals do not appear to be conceptually differentiated at 14 months. That infants can learn the difference in physical appearance of, say, dogs and cats at an early age has been amply shown by Quinn et al. (1993) . In everyday life, however, infants rarely have, undistracted by ongoing events, the kind of intensive and attention-directed exposure to a variety of dogs and cats in a single time and place that encourages comparison and consequent categorization.
The onset of language must encourage attention to the detail required to tell dogs from cats. The one-year-old may think something like self-moving interactor and overextend the newly learned word doggie to refer to both dogs and cats (or to animals in general; Clark, 1983) , but parents and other adults consistently call some animals dog and others cat. The child can categorize the difference in their shapes and may have also associated different sounds with the different shapes, but what the language presumably does is draw attention to these differences. A subdivision of self-moving things of a certain shape that makes a sound that parents call woof woof is called dog, and that other self-mover of a different overall shape that makes a sound parents call miaow is called cat.
Such conceptual advances are not deep, but perhaps especially with the help of the labels (Waxman & Markow, 1995) , they become stable and capable of sustaining associations that expand the conceptual categories already established. As just discussed, the research on inductive generalization in 14-month-olds suggests that, at first, global concepts control associativity-hence, infants' responses that all animals drink and all vehicles are keyed. However, the growing conceptual differentiation described in this article found during the first half of the second year suggests that conceptual associations become more constrained along with the differentiation. Therefore, what is observed with a car may no longer be generalized to a plane (see Gelman & Coley, 1990 , for relevant data with 2-year-olds). Thus, an increasingly differentiated hierarchical system of object concepts is generated.
Having said this, it is important to note that researchers still have relatively little information on how associative learning contributes to concept formation in infancy. In my view, associative learning needs to be divided into that which requires attention and leads to conceptual differentiation and that which may occur implicitly (procedurally), such as basic recognitory processes and emotional conditioning. These are fundamental issues in development that need to be extensively explored. In terms of the issues discussed in this article, however, the conceptual association of various behaviors and kinds of events with specific animals or artifacts does not seem to become established early, but is more likely to develop in the second year.
Language is also implicated in a second type of concept expansion, in which labels are attached to nonspatial perceptual or kinesthetic information. For example, color concepts, which obviously have no spatial description, tend to be fairly late acquisitions. They appear to consist of no more than a label that points to a particular type of sensory experience (see Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2005) . Colors, and many sounds as well, often remain that way-the concepts consisting merely of words pointing to otherwise unanalyzed perceptual experiences.
A third and pervasive source of new concepts is the analogical extension of spatial concepts into nonspatial realms. We know that a very large number of adult concepts-especially abstract ones-are formed in this way (Lakoff, 1987) . For example, the concept of comprehension is understood in terms of grasping or taking in. The concept of more is understood in terms of going up. We have little experimental data on infants in this regard, although problem solving on the basis of analogy is evident at least from 9 months (Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997; Piaget, 1952) , and there is some evidence in 11-month-olds of responsivity to the abstract analogical similarity between sights and sounds that leads to metaphorical understanding (Wagner, Winner, Cicchetti, & Gardner, 1981) . Indeed, the very fact of global concepts, which are based on limited instances, indicates that, early in life, infants are generalizing in an abstract way.
Finally, there are amalgamations of spatial descriptions with sensorimotor experience. Consider what might be needed to derive a concept of physical cause. I discussed earlier that infants' attention is attracted to caused motion and that they differentiate it from self-starting motion. I suggested that the mechanism of perceptual meaning analysis simplifies the spatial information involved in caused motion into an image schema of motion transfer, in which the infant interprets a causal motion scene as motion moving from one object into another. This is still rather far from an adult concept of physical cause, because no dynamism is yet implied. However, the infant can associate the notion of motion moving from one object to another with the feelings of umph experienced when hitting something or being hit. This amalgam seems to represent a simple understanding of physical causation. Part of the amalgam is a spatial description of motion moving from one object into another; the other part is a bodily feeling that quite likely is not further described. It may remain that way for most of us even in adulthood.
Conclusions
I began this article by saying that some consider the idea of infant concepts an oxymoron. In a way, I have returned to that notion, insofar as a concept may consist of a spatial description plus a nonconceptual bodily experience! But an advance has been made. One can see how early perceptual experiences can be pared down into simpler descriptions, a process that I assume is needed for thought to begin. As adults, we typically use words for this process; we ruminate in language. Researchers still do not know exactly what preverbal infants do, but there is evidence for conceptual thought-in their recall of past events, in their forming global object categories based on observations of events (such as the way things move or are moved), and in the control of their generalizations by these categories.
Although there is little direct evidence for the exact nature of the simplified descriptions that characterize infant concepts, the most likely candidates all seem to be spatial in nature. At first glance, such a conceptual system might seem far removed from that of adults, because spatial concepts are only a small part of the conceptual system. But when examined more closely, it can be seen that a good many adult nonspatial concepts are either metaphorical spatial extensions or consist of labels attached to sensorimotor experiences-colors, sounds, and emotional states like anger or fear. It may be that, before language, infants do not have these kinds of concepts; colors, sounds, and emotional experiences may not yet be connected to conceptual descriptions, and metaphorical extensions are probably yet to come. What infants do have in common with adults is a way of conceptualizing objects on the basis of their movements, the movements themselves, and the spatial outcomes that result from object movements. These go far toward forming a viable conceptual system. This system begun in infancy remains throughout normal life. It is disrupted under certain kinds of brain damage, for example, in semantic dementia, where it is the later, refined concepts that are the first to be lost, with the foundational global concepts the last to go (Hodges, Graham, & Patterson, 1995) . Individual categories are often overlaid with factual knowledge, such as that not all animals move or not all things living in the sea are fish, but like Ishmael in Moby Dick, in spite of his knowledge of the Linnaean system, many of us think in our heart of hearts that things that live totally in water are basically fish.
Infants need not be strangers to us. Their conceptual system is recognizably like that of adults, simpler to be sure but at bottom the same. A purely sensorimotor creature would be difficult for adults to understand, but a creature that interprets the world, albeit more globally than adults, makes clear the continuity of human thought throughout the life span. It is one of the reasons why parents can so easily communicate with infants.
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